Dr. Stephen Farnsworth: The Wildest Election for Governor in Virginia's History
Dr. Stephen Farnsworth of the University of Mary Washington joins the show to discuss the 1965 election for Virginia's governor--tracking the fall of the Byrd Machine in the wake of Massive Resistance, a third-party candidate who earned more than 13% of the vote, and a candidate running from Virginia's Nazi party.
Episode Transcript
Michael Pope
I'm Michael Pope. And this is Pod Virginia, a podcast that's digging way back into the archives today to talk about the 1965 election for governor. It's one of the craziest elections you'll ever hear about. And we've got the best guest today here to talk about this. He is the director of the Center for Leadership and Media Studies at the University of Mary Washington. And he's kindly invited me into his office in room 338 of Monroe Hall, Steven Farnsworth; thanks for coming back on the podcast.
Stephen Farnsworth
Glad to be here.
Michael Pope
And it's great to see you in person. So many of our listeners are thinking to themselves, 1965. Why the heck are we talking about 1965? Why is this election important to talk about and think about today?
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, Virginia had, for decades, a rural-based political machine that was run by the Bryd family. And the 1965 election is really their last true victory. The governors for generations had been Bryd loyalists. They controlled the Democratic Party when the Democratic Party was really the only game in town. But Mills Godwin, when the successful candidate in 1965, walked away from some of the massive resistance standards that the Bryd machine had. This was very much a white supremacist organization. And really, in some, the minds of some betrayed the Bryd organization. But he knew where Virginia was going. In. In the years that follow. Other Bryd candidates lose Democratic primaries as the electorate changes in Virginia. And by the time Godwin runs again for governor, eight years after his first victory, he runs as a Republican because of how the Bryd machine had collapsed almost overnight in the era of voting rights and civil rights in the country.
Michael Pope
So 1965 is really fascinating because it is the last gasp of the Byrd machine. It's also a time when the parties are looking at themselves and asking existential questions about who they are and what they stand for. And so you find there's a lot of residents with things that are happening today in this election, which is one of the reasons I thought it's worth unpacking it in this episode; let's set the stage here by talking about what people were thinking about in 1965. This is an era when the poll tax was recently done away with. And it's a time when the Byrd machine is losing its grip on power. Set the stage here for what's happening in 1965 and what's on people's minds now.
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, the Bryd machine had come to power based on rural politics, rural power in Virginia, the Virginia of two generations ago or beyond, was much more a rural-dominated state than it is today. The actions in courthouses around the Commonwealth were where the action was. The urban areas were much smaller than they are today. And the share of the vote that's being cast in rural areas really powered this machine. It was a vehicle for fiscal caution. The Bryd machine was famously opposed to debt. And so Virginia lagged in some ways in terms of economic development because of its resistance to debt for infrastructure. This was very much a small government conservative movement with a soup zone of patronage to ensure everybody was happy at the courthouses around the Commonwealth.
When the Brown versus the Board of Education desegregation ruling happened, Virginians were at the forefront, and the Bryd machine was at the forefront of the massive resistance movement. So you had very aggressive opposition to the Brown desegregation order here in Virginia, the Bryd machine, which controls the levers of power and blocks individuals. These school districts wanted to desegregate and follow the Constitution following the Supreme Court ruling. In some jurisdictions, politicians would move public money into private schooling and close public schools, even as they did in Prince Edward County, Virginia. And so you had a dynamic where the electorate of 1955 1960, which was virtually all white in Virginia, was going to be very supportive of this massive resistance movement. When we had a poll tax in Virginia, it created a much smaller electorate; if you had to pay even a couple of dollars to be a voter, many people wouldn't bother, so they didn't vote. And so Virginia politics never really had that kind of populist movement, like a Huey Long or something like that, that many southern states had. An oligarchy very much controlled Virginia. It was famously described as a museum piece of how the government used to be. And so the sort of patrician control of Virginia politics because, make no mistake about it, the poll tax discriminated against poor whites and African Americans. And so you had power. That was intense for those decades. But when the federal government has a constitutional amendment that ends the poll tax, when the federal government passes civil rights and voting rights laws, the Virginia electorate changes dramatically instantly. And the Democratic Party electorate, in particular, varies significantly. And so you had two choices if you were Mills or Godwin in the mid-1960s. Do you want to be part of the National Democratic Movement, the Lyndon Johnson civil rights movement? Or do you want to stick with the Bryd machine and go down effectively with the ship?
Michael Pope
Well, we will get to that before we do. Another thing I wanted to talk about to set the stage for 1965 happened the year before. Virginia famously has odd-year elections. And so every election cycle that elects a governor is a reaction to the presidential election that just previously happened. So in 64, we've got Lyndon Johnson, the Democrat winning against Republican Barry Goldwater, so Goldwater's performance in that election was seen as a disaster. Right. So explain the Goldwater phenomenon.
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, absolutely. Barry Goldwater's vision of the Republican Party was really out of step with the national electorate. Republicans who had previously been elected, like Dwight Eisenhower, were much more centrist in their politics. And in Virginia, the Republican party, to the extent it competed statewide and usually didn't offer all that competitive threat to the Democrats, has tended to be more liberal, particularly on civil rights questions, than the Democrats. It was easy to beat to the left of the Bryd machine on civil rights or desegregation. But there was a lot of space and opportunity for that. So the 1964 election was when Lyndon Johnson saw an excellent opportunity to shift the dynamics and many Republican states. And so in 64, Lyndon Johnson invested a lot in trying to keep the South democratic. And Virginia, which had always been more Republican than many other southern states because of the smaller electorate that skewed more affluent, was one of the key targets of the Johnson campaign in 64. And so, Lady Bird Johnson did a whistlestop tour through the Commonwealth. And one of the stops in Northern Virginia. Lo and behold, the person who introduced President Johnson was the same Mills Godwin serving as Lieutenant Governor. And that was seen by some in the Byrd machine as a betrayal.
Michael Pope
It was definitely seen as a betrayal. Interestingly, you said that Mills, Godwin is facing a choice. Does he go with the Bryd version of the Democratic Party or the Lyndon Johnson version of the Democratic Party? By getting on the Lady Bird Express. He's making his choice.
Stephen Farnsworth
Absolutely. And it was a recognition of how the Virginia electorate was changing, but he also had a little cover in terms of his history within the Bryd machine. And so, what you saw with the Godwin messaging of the '64 assistance for the Johnson campaign and the '65 campaign in his own right was that he tried to put forward a middle path. You would never describe him as, you know, 100% liberal this was not a 180-degree turn; what this was, was a course correction from the Democratic Party in Virginia of the 50s to the Democratic Party of Virginia after the Voting Rights civil rights act after the end of the poll tax because they're two very different Commonwealth in a matter of a few years. Godwin recognized that and realized, of course, that you know that the Republican Party was not likely to be a threat no matter what he did.
Michael Pope
Well, let's talk about those Republicans. The Republican on the ballot that year was a guy named Linwood Holton, who sets a name that will be familiar to our listeners because they will recognize that name as being the first Republican governor of Virginia since Reconstruction. But in 1965, he was the unsuccessful candidate for governor; right to tell our listeners a little about Linwood Holton.
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, Linwood Holton was an example of a Republican candidate who was more pro-civil rights and the Bryd machine. He was a lawyer in southwest Virginia; he worked his way up in Republican Party politics. And it wasn't too hard to get to the top because Republicans did win anything in statewide elections in those days. And so he was the candidate in '65. Now his plan was always run in '65. No, you would lose, particularly after the Goldwater debacle. But then you become a statewide figure, and in '69, as the electorate changes, you can mount a more successful campaign for governor so, so no doubt about this, like Mao in his long march. Linwood Holton had a vision of the distant future. And that worked out very, very well for him. Four years later, he won the governor's race.
Michael Pope
So, Mills, Godwin is the Democratic candidate, the choice of the Byrd machine. Linwood Holton is a Republican. But there are two more candidates in this race, and I want to discuss both. One of them is this guy, William Story, which is probably not a name that our listeners are familiar with. But they will recognize the group that he's part of, the John Birch Society; what the heck is the John Birch Society?
Stephen Farnsworth
It is very much a far-right conservative movement. It is a part of the Republican Party, part of the Republican Party, not kind of; this was an element of the Republican Party that didn't like Eisenhower much. And so very much a very, very conservative orientation. They were better connected to the Byrd organization into the National Democratic Party or the National Republican Party. What you saw, though, was an opportunity for conservatives to run a third-party candidate because of this pivot by Mills Godwin to the center...
Michael Pope
It would be the burden the people who felt like Mills, Godwin had sold out the Bryd machine had a choice to make with William Story.
Stephen Farnsworth
Right. And so if you are mad that Godwin had moved away from the Bryd machines, segregation, forever, politics, you had a candidate you could vote for. He didn't run as a John Birch; he ran a part of the Conservative Party of Virginia. But make no mistake about it. This was where a disaffected Bryd machine conservative could go, who could not stomach Godwin's adjustment in the 65 campaign. And he had a good run. When you compare his support to the Conservative Party of Virginia's support in the '65 election, you see one of the most successful third-party candidacies in Virginia history. This candidate got 13% of the vote in this election, which is extraordinarily high. When you look at third-party candidates, they get a percent, maybe a percent and a half, in statewide elections in Virginia. It's almost unheard of for a candidate outside the two-party system to be in double digits.
Michael Pope
You mentioned that Williams Story got 13% of the statewide vote. I'm particularly struck by these places where he racked up the vote. 80% of the voters in Amelia County voted for William Storey, 60% of the voters in Nottoway County, 55% of the voters in Brunswick County, and Prince Edward County; he actually did really good 48% Explain why William Storey did so well in these areas?
Stephen Farnsworth
These areas were the most intensely massive resistance-oriented parts of Virginia. They were rural areas that had been very tight with the Bryd machine. And, of course, you mentioned Prince Edward County and the neighboring counties. These are areas that opposed desegregation. And they were fighting it to the extent that they, even in Prince Edward County, closed the public schools rather than have African American children and white children in the same classroom; that kind of extremism is something that really, really would not have cottoned to Godwin's pivot in '65. And so here's your opportunity to cast a protest vote. Undoubtedly, the Republican Party, the more liberal party, doesn't win those voters. People want to avoid going in that direction. What they want to go in is a protest vote and a big protest vote, particularly in South Side and Southwest Virginia, where the Bryd machine had been powerful in this; this pivot by this candidate was not well received.
Michael Pope
So we've got the Bryd machine candidate, we've got the Republican candidate, we've got the John Birch candidate, but there's one other person we need to talk about, a fourth candidate on the ballot, running as a candidate for the Nazi Party, George Lincoln Rockwell, who was this guy?
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, he was the voice of the American Nazi Party nationally; he was based in Virginia and ran for a run for governor in '65; he once again saw an opening as the Democratic Party was moving away from sort of the far-right views of the Bryd machine, this creates another opportunity. But obviously, there is going to be, I mean, a ceiling on anyone who is on the ballot, who has a, you know, affiliation with the American Nazi Party. And so, the protest votes primarily went to the Conservative Party candidate rather than the independent, who had that Nazi background. Remember, this is only 20 years after the end of World War Two. Nazis do not have a lot of electoral appeals, even in conservative states.
Michael Pope
So we get to election day, and one thing that happens in the run-up to the election is all the endorsements. Surprisingly, labor endorses the Bryd machine candidate, which things are upside down. And then cats living with dogs. How could American labor organizations in Virginia ever support the Bryd machine candidate?
Stephen Farnsworth
Well, much of that had to do with this particular candidate. Because Mills, Godwin had worked with the Johnson reelection campaign, and '64, there was pressure on unions to come and dance with the one who brung you. And so there was a lot of pressure from Washington to help this candidate. And that created an environment where unions were willing to support a Bryd machine Democrat. That only sometimes happened in Virginia, particularly in statewide elections. Because the Bryd machine was all about right-to-work and anti-union legislation, they were all about minimal government spending. And so unions that would benefit from labor contracts that would benefit from construction contracts, those sorts of things weren't happening in Virginia. And for organized labor, this was one of the few candidates with a pedigree with the Bryd machine that they could find acceptable. And they only found him good in '65. He was less appealing to organized labor years earlier when he was elected Lieutenant Governor.
Michael Pope
So we've been talking a lot about the Bryd machine. At the center of the Bryd machine, of course, is US Senator Harry Bryd, who waits until the end of the campaign to endorse. Many people were expecting him not to make any endorsement. And he was famous for something called the Golden Silence, where he would not say anything; very, very late in the campaign, he made an endorsement. What do you make of that?
Stephen Farnsworth
At that point, it was clear Godwin was going to win with a Bryd endorsement or not. And so you know, once you figure out where the crowd is going, a successful politician often ensures they're at the front of that crowd. The reality is that the Bryd machine didn't have a choice. Godwin was the nominee; he had been a sitting lieutenant governor and machine loyalist all those years. And there wasn't much that the Bryd machine could do in any practical way to mount any serious challenge. The Conservative Party of Virginia was limited, and its upside appeal. People were used to voting for Democrats in Virginia in this era. And so the Bryd machine, I think the Bryd machine waited until the end, you know, Senator Byrd because he might have hoped that there would be some more appealing configuration. Or he had plans of never endorsing a candidate in this race. So one of the things that Harry Byrd often did was failed to support Democratic candidates who were running for president because he thought they were too liberal, and just about every Democrat running for national office was going to be too liberal for Harry Bryd.
Michael Pope
So 1965 election Mills Godwin won with 48% of the vote, so not even at 50%, just barely squeaked by here with 48% of the vote. And then there's a lot of interesting stuff after this election. This is a pivot point here. The following year, the primary season was crazy; what happened to the 1966 primaries?
Stephen Farnsworth
This is where we see the foresight that Mills Godwin had in '65. Because in '66, it was a disaster for the Byrd machine in the Democratic primary, what had used what had been for generations, an anointing became an actual competition of extraordinarily differing visions of what the Democratic Party represented. You had liberals looking at the Democratic primary electorate of Virginia in '66, saying, hey, here's our chance. You had a liberal Democrat who ran against Willis Robertson, the other senator besides Harry Byrd. He beat him in a Democratic primary, and incumbent Bryd machine Democratic senator loses in a primary. You had Howard Smith, a congressman from Northern Virginia, who had been the head of the House Rules Committee and been one of the critical voices in Washington to block civil rights, which blocked any of the desegregation efforts that a lot of other Democrats wanted to see happen. He loses in a primary as well. And so you see two of the biggest names in Bryd machine politics, defeating in a democratic primary and '66. And Harry Bryd was running in a special election for his father's old seat when the primary but by the time he ran for reelection for a full term in 1970, Byrd then has to run as an independent he couldn't even control the Democratic Party primary process any longer.
Michael Pope
You indirectly touched on Harry Bryd Sr's death, which comes right at this pivot point, like the Bryd machine is losing its grip on power. They elect their final candidate in Mills Godwin is the last Bryd machine candidate. And then Harry Bryd dies. And we see so many of these Democrats abandon the Democratic Party, right the Bryd machine Democrats abandoned the Democratic Party you mentioned Harry Byrd Jr. left the Democratic Party in 1970. And then in 1973, Mills Godwin goes the Democratic Party, right?
Stephen Farnsworth
Right. Mills, Godwin, for those of you who played bar trivia on Virginia politics, he is the only candidate in the 20 century to run and win two terms as governor because we have a one consecutive term limit; you have to sit out the next four years or more before you come back. He's the only one to have won twice in the 20th century. He's also the only one to win in two different parties. In '73, when he returned and won another term as governor, he won as a Republican. And so the dynamic of Virginia becomes incredibly scrambled in this era, the remnants of the Bryd machine that are still out there, they try to take over the Republican Party, and they end up creating a more conservative Republican Party in the years that follow. It's never been a complete control of the Republican Party. Because, of course, the Bryd machines still had to deal with, you know, Linwood Holton and the much more liberal vision of Republicanism, Republicanism that we saw in Virginia for many years with Senator John Warner. And so there was always that liberal Republican element doing battle with a conservative Republican element in the Republican Party during these years of the 70s. But for the Democrats of this era, the collapse of the Bryd machine creates a much more liberal set of Democratic candidates. But it doesn't necessarily give them a lot of wins in the 1970s. It's really Chuck Robb, who tries to build a bridge with more conservative Democrats and more liberal Democrats, who really sets the Democratic Party on a more successful course going forward. The immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Bryd machine in '75 is that Republicans start winning just about everywhere, statewide.
Michael Pope
One final question on this, and I appreciate you humoring me with this topic, which is a little bit off the beaten path here. What lessons can be learned from this? What are the takeaways from this?
Stephen Farnsworth
I think the world that we know in politics today is this same question of identity crisis that the politicians of the 1960s face; what does it mean to be a Democrat? What does it mean to be Republican? How is Virginia changing? And how, as a politician, can politicians change along with it? You saw, for example, in the Glenn Youngkin campaign, an idea of matching up sort of the Bob's for jobs, Bob McDonnell conversation of 2009; he had, of course, being the last successful Republican candidate for governor before Youngkin. And so Younkin says the way to win in Virginia is to sort of follow the template of Bob McDonnell, focus on economic issues don't really focus on the conservative agenda that is so popular with the Republican base in the primaries, among those hardcore Republican voters. Youngkin could do this, in part because the Republican Party being tired of losing, created a nomination system that allowed them greater control than a primary. And so the most pro-Trump choices for the Republican party didn't win the nomination in Youngkin, did now as a governor Youngkin is, you know, potentially eyeing sort of more of a national profile and governing, perhaps in a more conservative way than his campaign might have suggested he would. But it's, in many ways, it's still a legacy of this era.
What does it mean to be a conservative? What does it mean to be a Republican? What does it mean to be a Democrat? Virginia struggles with these issues; even now, the next set of elections here in Virginia, we're looking at, you know, elections for all those House of Delegates and Senate seats in November, we're likely to see a very different Democratic majority caucus or minority caucus, then we saw even ten years ago. And so the old, more liberal ones are replacing more conservative Democrats; the centrist governing coalition that called the shots in Virginia from the 1960s until the present day looks to be on its very last legs. We're going to see the growing Washingtonisation. I think of Richmond; it's already been happening. If you believe a generation ago, when we had Russ Potts and John Chichester in Virginia Senate calling the shots telling liberals and conservatives that the center rules Virginia? That's not the future of Virginia, perhaps.
Michael Pope
Steven Farnsworth at the University of Mary Washington. Thanks for coming back on pod Virginia.
